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When a French judge interviewed the ex-wife of French politician Thierry Gaubert, she told him that her husband returned from a trip carrying ‘briefcases full of cash’; that cash is alleged to have funded the 1994-’95 French presidential campaign of Edouard Balladur. Through a system of commissions and re-commissions, kickbacks, dealers, Swiss bank accounts and suitcases, the money from an arms sale from France to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia was allegedly transferred back to the Balladur government that originally approved the deal. Later, 11 engineers from the defence company DCN that sold Pakistan the submarines from this deal were killed in a terrorist attack—allegedly because promised bribes went unpaid. Politicians, military and intelligence leaders, and defence companies work closely together. This proximity can facilitate the process of doing business in a highly technical, complex, and sensitive field. But it can also facilitate corruption. The defence sector tends to command a significant portion of the national budget. It involves sensitive information, and can be an important and volatile political issue. In many countries, military leaders and defence companies tend to be influential actors in national politics. The size and influence of the sector can be a tempting source of corruption for politicians, particularly if there is a lack of transparency to the public that elects them.
Although politicians themselves can be corrupt, of course, effective oversight by elected leaders is a vital protection against corruption in the defence sector. Major defence decisions—the defence budget, arms purchases, the decision of whether to declare war or conduct peacekeeping operations—are made by political leadership and legislatures, along with military officials. In order to have defence and security forces that are accountable to their citizens, a representative legislature must have the power to oversee defence decisions, to investigate potential cases of corruption—and to be able to access the information if they need to. An openly published and clear national defence policy should form the foundation for decision-making and actions in the defence sector. For example, if a defence policy states a need to protect the nation from a particular threat, and identifies gaps in the existing capability of the national defence establishment, that policy will inform procurement decisions (the purchase of arms or military equipment) and justify purchases. The procurement process itself poses enormous corruption risk, but corruption can start before tenders are issued and contracts awarded, when governments develop a defence and security policy. If a defence policy indicates a need for particular equipment—for example, a helicopter with certain qualities—that policy can affect who the country purchases from, and even favour a particular supplier. Without strong controls and oversight in place, politicians may be swayed by bribes, personal or political influence towards a defence policy that meets their needs—not the country’s. Read more. Read the full blog 'Playing politics with national security' at Reuters TrustLaw. Learn more about our Governments Defence Anti-Corruption Index, to be launched on 29 January 2013. Read more about Our Work and Focus Areas. Read other blogs we've written. |






