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Arms Export Controls
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To prevent these corruption risks from materialising, the discrete arms export licensing regimes maintained by most arms exporting states should include an examination of the risk that arms are transferred in a process which risks being undermined by corruption at any stage. Yet even within some of the most advanced export control regimes, corruption risks are not specifically addressed.
Transparency International's Defence and Security Programme (TI DSP) thus strongly recommends that export licensing organisations test whether a licence application is free from corruption and bribery before issuing an export licence. At the moment, the legally binding European Council Common Position only refers to corruption in its User Guide, where it considers it best practice to assess corruption risks for three of the eight criteria EU member states need to apply before issuing an arms export license: the respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the recipient country, the national security of member states and their friends and allies, and the risk of diversion and undesirable re-exports. This underlines the cross-cutting nature of corruption risks in arms exports. EU member states have expressed themselves as anxious to stamp out corruption wherever possible, including in the context of arms transfers, and have signed up to various anti-corruption agreements (such as the UN Convention Against Corruption, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention Against Corruption). It would therefore be consistent with this stance for EU member states to amend the European Council Common Position and agree a new ninth criterion whereby prosepective transfers would be refused, where there is a clear risk that they might involve corrupt practices.
Read more on our Focus Areas. Read more on Our Work. |






The international arms trade is among the