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Defence & Security Policy
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This situation allows corrupt individuals or groups to influence defence and security policy - for instance, to create a requirement for procurement of jets when no such need exists, in order to gain personally through a connection with the company offering the jets. The resulting procurement process may be largely clean, yet fundamentally flawed.
More generally, a defence and security policy process may be manipulated or overcomplicated in order to hide corrupt decisions and illicit enrichment, in cases where, for example, a policy approval procedure is lacking or policy decisions are not published. In the most extreme cases, defence corruption at the highest level might represent ‘state capture’, which arises when outside interests (often the private sector, mafia networks, etc.) are able to shape state decisions. Unfortunately, this example is far from unique. Another such instance is the 2002 sale of a very costly military air traffic control system by BAE Systems to Tanzania-which has no air force or military aircraft. The deal has not only been declared by the World Bank and Civil Aviation Organisation as unneccesary and overpriced, but has also resulted in BAE Systems being fined £500 000 for concealing payments to a middleman. Read more on Political Risks. Read more on Our Work. |






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