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Defence & Security Policy
National defence and security policies form the bedrock of countries’ actions and efforts in this crucial area, and can also serve as entry points for corruption at the highest level. A vague, opaque, or unpublished defence and security policy, or one that does not contain adequate democratic oversight and scrutiny mechanisms, allows and sometimes facilitates corruption throughout the nation's defence and security establishments.
This situation allows corrupt individuals or groups to influence defence and security policy - for instance, to create a requirement for procurement of jets when no such need exists, in order to gain personally through a connection with the company offering the jets. The resulting procurement process may be largely clean, yet fundamentally flawed.
More generally, a defence and security policy process may be manipulated or overcomplicated in order to hide corrupt decisions and illicit enrichment, in cases where, for example, a policy approval procedure is lacking or policy decisions are not published. In the most extreme cases, defence corruption at the highest level might represent ‘state capture’, which arises when outside interests (often the private sector, mafia networks, etc.) are able to shape state decisions.
South Africa’s 1999 Arms Procurement Package initiated by its newly-elected democratic government is a poignant illustration of such corruption risk within defence and security policies. Costing over US $4.8 billion, the programme has been fraught with widespread corruption allegations for over a decade, with over US $200 million in "commission payments" to various covert and overt advisors made by just one of the Western contractors involved. This resulted in the purchase of a jet that was not only exorbitantly expensive but also publically opposed by the Air Force, which preferred a different-and cheaper-aircraft.."
Unfortunately, this example is far from unique. Another such instance is the 2002 sale of a very costly military air traffic control system by BAE Systems to Tanzania-which has no air force or military aircraft. The deal has not only been declared by the World Bank and Civil Aviation Organisation as unneccesary and overpriced, but has also resulted in BAE Systems being fined £500 000 for concealing payments to a middleman.
Read more on Political Risks.
Read more on Our Work.





